Drafts

The Case for Strong Longtermism

Let strong longtermism be the thesis that in a wide class of decision situations, the option that is ex ante best is contained in a fairly small subset of options whose ex ante effects on the very long-run future are best. If this thesis is correct, it suggests that for decision purposes, we can often simply ignore shorter-run effects: the primary determinant of how good an option is (ex ante) is how good its effects on the very long run are. This paper sets out an argument for strong longtermism. We argue that the case for this thesis is quite robust to plausible variations in various normative assumptions, including relating to population ethics, interpersonal aggregation and decision theory. We also suggest that while strong longtermism as defined above is a purely axiological thesis, a corresponding deontic thesis plausibly follows, even by non-consequentialist lights.

Evolution, utilitarianism, and normative uncertainty: the practical significance of debunking arguments

It has been argued that evolutionary considerations favour utilitarianism by selectively debunking its competitors. However, evolutionary considerations also seem to undermine the practical significance of utilitarianism, since common-sense beliefs about well-being seem like prime candidates for evolutionary debunking. We argue that the practical significance of utilitarianism is not undermined in this way if we understand the requirements of practical rationality as sensitive to normative uncertainty. We consider the view that rational decision-making under normative uncertainty requires maximizing expected choice-worthiness, as well as the possibility that different theories’ choice-worthiness rankings are not all interval-scale measurable nor intertheoretically comparable.

Forthcoming

The Evidentialist’s Wager

The Journal of Philosophy

Suppose that an altruistic and morally motivated agent who is uncertain between evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) finds herself in a situation in which the two theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act in accordance with EDT. First, we claim that that the appropriate response to normative uncertainty is to hedge one’s bets. That is, if the stakes are much higher on one theory than another, and the credences you assign to each of these theories aren’t very different, then it’s appropriate to choose the option which performs best on the high-stakes theory. Second, we show that, given the assumption of altruism, the existence of correlated decision-makers will increase the stakes for EDT but leave the stakes for CDT unaffected. Together these two claims imply that whenever there are sufficiently many correlated agents, the appropriate response is to act in accordance with EDT.

The Paralysis Argument

Philosophers’ Imprint

Given plausible assumptions about the long-run impact of our everyday actions, we show that standard non-consequentialist constraints on doing harm entail that we should try to do as little as possible in our lives. We call this the Paralysis Argument. After laying out the argument, we consider and respond to a number of objections. We then suggest what we believe is the most promising response: to accept, in practice, a highly demanding morality of beneficence with a long-term focus.

Effective Altruism

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

In this entry, we discuss both the definition of effective altruism and objections to effective altruism, so defined.

Are We Living at the Hinge of History?

Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit, Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich, and Ketan Ramakrishnan (eds).

When Should an Effective Altruist Donate?

Moral Issues of Giving in Time, Ray Madoff and Benjamin Soskis (eds).

Forthcoming.

Effective Altruism

The Norton Introduction to Ethics, Elizabeth Harman and Alex Guerrero (eds).

Forthcoming.

Longtermist Institutional Reform

The Long View, Natalie Cargill (ed).

Forthcoming.

2020

Statistical normalization methods in interpersonal and intertheoretic comparisons

The Journal of Philosophy, 2020

A major problem for interpersonal aggregation is how to compare utility across individuals; a major problem for decision-making under normative uncertainty is the formally analogous problem of how to compare choice-worthiness across theories. We introduce and study a class of methods, which we call statistical normalization methods, for making interpersonal comparisons of utility and intertheoretic comparisons of choice-worthiness. We argue against the statistical normalization methods that have been proposed in the literature. We argue, instead, in favor of normalization of variance: we claim that this is the account that most plausibly gives all individuals or theories ‘equal say’. To this end, we provide two proofs that variance normalization has desirable properties that all other normalization methods lack, though we also show how different assumptions could lead one to axiomatize alternative statistical normalization methods.

2019

The Definition of Effective Altruism

Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, 2019

The term “effective altruism” has no official definition, meaning that different authors will inevitably understand the term in different ways. Since this harbours the potential for considerable confusion, William MacAskill, one of the leaders of the effective altruism movement, has contributed a chapter aimed at forestalling some of these potential confusions. In this chapter, MacAskill first outlines a brief history of the effective altruism movement. He then proposes his preferred definition of “effective altruism”, aiming to capture the central activities and concerns of those most deeply involved in the movement. Finally, he replies to various common misconceptions about the movement. These include the views that effective altruism is just utilitarianism, that it is purely about poverty alleviation, that it is purely about donations, and that it in principle ignores possibilities for systemic change.

Aid scepticism and Effective Altruism

Journal of Practical Ethics, 2019

In the article, ‘Being Good in a World of Need: Some Empirical Worries and an Uncomfortable Philosophical Possibility,’ Larry Temkin presents some concerns about the possible impact of international aid on the poorest people in the world, suggesting that the nature of the duties of beneficence of the global rich to the global poor are much more murky than some people have made out.

In this article, I’ll respond to Temkin from the perspective of effective altruism—one of the targets he attacks. I’ll argue that Temkin’s critique has little empirical justification, given the conclusions he wants to reach, and is therefore impotent.

Practical Ethics given Moral Uncertainty

Utilitas, 2019

A number of philosophers have claimed that we should take not just empirical uncertainty but also fundamental moral uncertainty into account in our decision-making, and that, despite widespread moral disagreement, doing so would allow us to draw robust lessons for some issues in practical ethics. In this article, I argue that, so far, the implications for practical ethics have been drawn too simplistically. First, the implications of moral uncertainty for normative ethics are far more wide-ranging than has been noted so far. Second, one can't straightforwardly argue from moral uncertainty to particular conclusions in practical ethics, both because of ‘interaction’ effects between moral issues, and because of the variety of different possible intertheoretic comparisons that one can reasonably endorse.

A Research Agenda for the Global Priorities Institute

Global Priorities Institute, 2019, co-authored with Hilary Greaves, Rossa O’Keefe-O’Donovan & Philip Trammell

In this research agenda, we outline the landscape for global priorities research.

2018

Understanding Effective Altruism and its Challenges

David Boonin (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, 2018

Effective altruism is the use of evidence and reason to figure out how to benefit others as much as possible and the taking of action on that basis. This chapter discusses the moral framework and methodological approach that effective altruism uses to prioritize causes, charities, and careers, and examines some of the world problems that, on this perspective, appear to be most urgent and important: global health and development, non-human animal suffering, and risks to long-term human survival. It then lays out some of the most important unsolved problems facing the effective altruist project.

Why Maximize Expected Choice-Worthiness?

Noûs, 2018

This paper argues in favor of a particular account of decision‐making under normative uncertainty: that, when it is possible to do so, one should maximize expected choice‐worthiness . Though this position has been often suggested in the literature and is often taken to be the ‘default’ view, it has so far received little in the way of positive argument in its favor. After dealing with some preliminaries and giving the basic motivation for taking normative uncertainty into account in our decision‐making, we consider and provide new arguments against two rival accounts that have been offered—the accounts that we call ‘My Favorite Theory’ and ‘My Favorite Option’. We then give a novel argument for comparativism —the view that, under normative uncertainty, one should take into account both probabilities of different theories and magnitudes of choice‐worthiness. Finally, we further argue in favor of maximizing expected choice‐worthiness and consider and respond to five objections.

Giving isn’t demanding

Paul Woodruff (ed.), The Ethics of Giving: Philosophers' Perspectives on Philanthropy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 178-203 (co-written with Andreas Mogensen and Toby Ord)

In this chapter, we argue that a Very Weak Principle of Sacrifice, requiring us to give 10% of our income to cost-effective charities, is not very demanding at all, and therefore that the “demandingness” objection has not even pro tanto force against it. Whatever one thinks about the demandingness of Singer’s two proposed principles, one should therefore endorse the Very Weak Principle of Sacrifice and agree that we still have significant obligations to use our income to effectively improve the lives of others.

2017

Effective Altruism - Introduction

Essays in Philosophy, vol. 18, Issue 1 (2017)

I define effective altruism, and introduce essays related to the concepts in the journal.

Effective Reducetarianism

The Reducetarian Solution, Brian Kateman (ed.), 2017.

2014

Replaceability, Career Choice, and Making a Difference

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 17, no. 2 (April, 2014), pp. 269-283

I defend the idea that deliberately pursuing a lucrative career in order to donate a large proportion of one's earnings is typically ethically preferable to a career within the charity sector.

Normative Uncertainty

PhD dissertation, March 2014

What ought you to do when you don't know what you ought to do? I argue broadly in favour of the idea that we should treat moral uncertainty and empirical uncertainty analogously, with expected utility theory providing the correct formal framework. I provide some modifications to this idea in order to overcome some problems, and then chart its implications for practical ethics and decision theory.

2013

The Infectiousness of Nihilism

Ethics, vol. 123, no. 3 (April, 2013), pp. 508-520

In “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism,” Jacob Ross argues that a rational decision maker is permitted, for the purposes of practical reasoning, to assume that nihilism is false. I argue that Ross’s argument fails because the principle he relies on conflicts with more plausible principles of rationality and leads to preference cycles. I then show how the infectiousness of nihilism, and of incomparability more generally, poses a serious problem for the larger project of attempting to incorporate moral uncertainty into expected value maximization style reasoning.